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Introduction
In the economics literature, corruption is often viewed as governance failure, which is reflected in the popular definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. Public officials or bureaucrats are assumed to be rational utility-maximizing agents who decide to use discretionary power to extract bribes when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (Kitgaard, 1988 ; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) . Such a framework implies that institutional reforms raising the relative costs of corrupt behavior (e.g., reforms aimed to improve the separation of powers, increase government transparency and accountability, raise penalties for corruption or salaries of bureaucrats) could help to curb corruption. This This mainstream economic approach towards corruption, however, has a yawning gap: it disregards the fact that corruption is socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996) .
While this approach considers relationships between bureaucrats and private actors as impersonal, similar to the relationships between sellers and buyers in the market, in reality corrupt transactions occur between socially connected actors. Economists should, better than any other social scientists, understand that two random individuals are not usually able to make a corrupt deal due to incomplete information and the threat of legal punishment. Before offering a bribe, the potential bribe-giver should find the "right" bureaucrat who will not report to police and will fulfill the obligation to provide the informal service requested. The bureaucrat will not take a bribe if she or he does not trust the bribe-giver. It is the social connectedness between a potential bribe-giver and a bribe-taker, their belonging to a common social network, which makes the whole business possible, provides missing information and promotes mutual trust and guarantees. Therefore, it is more plausible to assume that corrupt transactions take place within a social network than that they take place in an impersonal market.
The important role of social connections in shaping corruption was first emphasized by Scott in his seminal study of corruption in developing nations (Scott, 1969) . He explicitly distinguished between impersonal bribery -market corruption -and corruption based on social or business connections -non-market or parochial corruption. Although some subsequent studies have provided a more explicit theoretical discussion of these types of corruption (e.g., Husted, 1994; Lambsdorff, 2002; Kingston, 2007) , this division still remains out of the mainstream economic literature on corruption. Widely cited analytical reviews, including works by Aidt (2003) , Bardhan (1997 Bardhan ( , 2006 , Jain (2001) , and Tanzi (1998), do not contain any explicit discussion on the role of social connections. As mentioned by Aidt (2003: p.F632) "Most economic models of corruption take a somewhat parsimonious view focusing largely on market corruption or bribery". The interplay between bribery and the use of social connections generates three possible types of corruption. The first type (Sector 1 in Fig.1 ) reflects bribery which is not related to social connections. This is market corruption in Scott's terms. The second type is bribery through social connections (Sector 2). As economists often reduce all bribery to market corruption, they assume (erroneously) that bribery is completely homogenous and thus Sector 2 does not exist. The last type is corruption through social connections without paying bribes (Sector 3). Economists, unlike sociologists or anthropologists, often ignore this type of corruption based on reciprocal exchanges of favors within a social network. Sectors 2 and 3
together form parochial corruption in terms of Scott. We prefer, however, the term proposed by Granovetter (2007) and call it network corruption.
Parochial (network) corruption Bribery Therefore, reducing all corruption to impersonal bribery is an oversimplification and can be very misleading. If Sector 3 (see Fig.1 ) is large, then it leads to an underestimation of the overall scale of corruption. Moreover, if network corruption is not a perfect complement to bribery, then it also distorts national corruption rankings. As the qualities of network corruption should substantially differ from the qualities of impersonal bribery, reducing all corruption to impersonal bribery means misunderstanding of the nature of corruption, its causes and effects, and thus misguides anti-corruption policies, especially in countries with high network corruption.
Despite these concerns, there are no empirical studies (as far as we know) that explicitly distinguish network corruption and examine it together with bribery. While economists traditionally do not pay much attention to social ties when studying corruption, quantitative sociological studies on corruption are rare and the 'sociological turn' in corruption research has been mostly theoretical and qualitative (Heath et al., 2017; Uberti, , 2017 Granovetter, we explicitly distinguish between bribery and network corruption and examine them jointly using data from the 2nd and 3rd rounds of Life in Transition Survey (LiTS)
conducted by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development in 2010 and 2016. As in many previous cross-national studies of corruption, we measure both types of corruption in terms of people's perceptions. Our key measure of bribery reflects the perceived importance of paying bribes for 'getting things done', while our measure of network corruption reflects the perceived importance of using social connections. Besides the fact that LiTS allows us to distinguish these types of corruption, its other advantage is that it covers all post-socialist countries which present an excellent "laboratory" to study market and network corruption. On the one hand, these countries exhibit relatively high levels of corruption rooted, as many authors argue, in the Soviet "blat" (Ledeneva, 1998 (Ledeneva, , 2008 Gellbach, 2001; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005) , which is in line with conclusions from more general literature on the legacies of the Soviet regime (e.g., Obydenkova & Libman, 2014) . On the other hand, the transition to a market economy in these countries disturbed old social networks, increased the value of money, and spurred the decentralization of government, which all led to the increase of bribery (e.g., Levin & Satarov, 2000 , 2015 . As a result, the current profile of corruption in post-socialist countries should represent a mix of its network and market types. As LiTS additionally covers a few
Western European countries, we are able compare the scale and structure of corruption in postsocialist societies with those in mature market economies.
Our main findings and their implications may be summarized as follows. First of all, we find that the country-level correlation between bribery and network corruption is weak and corresponding national rankings are different. Countries with the highest levels of bribery are not the same countries as those with the highest levels of network corruption, and many countries with moderate levels of bribery exhibit relatively high levels of network corruption.
Therefore, ignoring network corruption means underestimating the overall scale of corruption and distorting national corruption rankings.
Secondly, in line with theoretical expectations, we show that qualities of network corruption differ from qualities of bribery: network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics but more associated with communist and pre-communist legacies than bribery. This suggests that taking network corruption into consideration could help uncover the reasons for the persistence of corruption and its resistance to the redesign of formal institutions (e.g., Persson, Rotstein & Teorell, 2013; Heywood, 2017) .
We also find that while bribery is strongly and positively related to political instability, network corruption is not related to it. This might shed some light on why in some countries high corruption generates political instability but in others it does not: this could be due to different balances between market and network corruption.
We do not find any correlation between network corruption and the incidence of selfemployment, while in the case of bribery this correlation is strong and positive. This result is interesting in the light of discussion on the extent to which corruption may 'grease-thewheels' (e.g., Meon & Sekkat, 2005; Meon & Weil, 2010) , suggesting that it is market corruption that is able to 'grease' as it assumes more open access to public services than the network type.
Lastly, we show that the decline in bribery which was observed, according to the LiTS data, in almost all post-socialist countries from 2010 to 2016 (see also EBRD, 2016) was accompanied by rising network corruption in many of them. Taking into account different qualities of bribery and network corruption, these trends have important policy implications and cannot be considered as the retreat of corruption in the region.
Overall, our paper shows that taking into account social connections could enrich and improve the economics approach towards corruption. At the same time, our study advances a distinction between market and network corruption, which was largely abandoned in the economics literature, as a useful tool for better understanding the qualities of corruption in any given country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a theoretical discussion on market and network corruption, formulate key differences between them, and specify the research hypotheses. In section 3, we describe data and methodology used. In section 4, we present our findings. Section 5 summarizes and discusses our main results. This is a reduced version of J. Nye's definition: "Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Nye, 1967: p.419 ). 2 In this sense, market corruption is similar to "efficient corruption" discussed by Aidt (2003) . 3 Such payments are widespread in healthcare (Lewis, 2000) and traffic police (e.g., Indem , 2013). 4 A prominent example is a network supervised by Vladimiro Monestesinos in Peru, see McMillan & Zoido (2004) . corruption, the winner of the auction mentioned above will be a firm that is connected to the bureaucrat but which is not necessarily the most efficient firm that is able to pay the highest informal bid. 5 The fact that network corruption operates through social connections, while market corruption is an impersonal market-like transaction, implies further important differences between them. First of all, network corruption should be more persistent than market corruption, as it is embedded in social networks and structures which usually evolve slowly and tend to reproduce themselves (e.g., Doreian & Stokman, 1997) . This embeddedness should make network corruption less vulnerable to changes in formal institutions and more 'path-dependent' and related to the historical and cultural background than market corruption.
Another difference between network and market corruption concerns access to the public services they provide. As the number of insiders is, by definition, less than the number of outsiders, network corruption provides more restricted access than market corruption. In other words, the number of agents who could benefit from corruption should be larger for market corruption than for network corruption.
Further, the impersonal nature of market corruption implies that the reward to the bureaucrat should have a universal value, irrespective of the personalities of the parties of the corrupt deal.
The best candidate for such a role is money. Consequently, market corruption should always involve the transfer of money (usually cash). Network corruption means that not only money but also some non-monetary gratitude in the form of a gift, reciprocal service, or respect may potentially serve as the reward (e.g., Cartier-Bresson, 1997). Moreover, due to the persistent social connectedness of the parties this reward may be delayed in time, which is much more difficult in the case of market corruption.
It is natural to expect that market corruption is riskier than network corruption. One reason is that money transfers are easier to detect than reciprocal and delayed non-monetary exchanges.
Another reason is the strong enforcement mechanisms that are built into informal networks and efficiently prevent opportunistic behaviors and whistle-blowing (Kingston, 2007) . Moreover, the members of informal networks are often bonded by strong "esprit de corps", which complicates any legal investigations against them (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2002; McMillan & Zoido, 2004) . Market corruption lacks such mechanisms. 5 Uribe (2014) presents a formal theoretical model of auction when a public official responsible for the auction is related to firm making bids.
Related concepts
Network corruption is related to several concepts studied in social sciences. Perhaps, the closest concept is 'blat', which is the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply (Ledeneva, 1998) . Blat was widespread in socialist countries in Soviet times and may be viewed as a predecessor of network corruption in modern post-socialist societies. 6 Another close concept is 'favoritism' which, basically, is giving unjustified preferences to certain individuals, either to relatives ('nepotism' or 'familism', see Banfield, There are also typologies of corruption (e.g., see Bussell, 2015 for a comprehensive review) that intersect with the division between market and network corruption highlighted in our paper, but none of them focus on the role of social connections in shaping corruption (see Table 1 ). This division is, however, silent on the issue of relatedness between bureaucrats and private agents, therefore both market and network corruption may be both centralized and decentralized. 6 Chinese 'guanxi' may be considered as an analogue of blat as it also relies on personal connections and helps to cope with the shortage. Guanxi, however, seems to be more culturally ingrained and morally justified than blat (Chen et al., 2013; Ledeneva, 2008) . In Arab World, a concept similar to guanxi is 'wasta' (Hutchings & Weir, 2006) . Network corruption may be both monetary and non-monetary, grand and petty, political and bureaucratic. 7 While market corruption may be both extortive and collusive, network corruption, by definition, can be only collusive. 8 As network corruption often assumes 7 Strong political corruption may take a form of 'state capture', when the whole decision-making process in the state is influenced by private agents or groups. Therefore, network corruption is much more related to state capture than market corruption. 8 A related distinction but with a slightly different focus is between 'helping hand' and 'grabbing hand' corruption (e.g., see Chen, 2004; Chen, Hillman & Gu., 2002) . In both cases bureaucrats take bribes, but in the former case nepotism, this type of corruption should have a lighter shade than market corruption, as it is more justifiable to help relatives or good friends than take bribes from unknown people.
Research hypotheses
The theory states that network corruption differs from market corruption in many respects. We analyze to what extent these differences exist in practice and what practical implications they have. If they are different, then reducing all corruption to market corruption means seriously misunderstanding corruption, especially in countries with high network corruption. Below we formulate more concrete hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section.
Persistence of corruption
As the expectation that network corruption is more persistent than market corruption is too general to be tested empirically, we unpack it into more concrete hypotheses. We distinguish three hypotheses that refer to different dimensions of persistence. The first one touches time persistence: Hypothesis 1.1: network corruption is more stable over time than market corruption.
The second dimension of persistence concerns the sensitivity of corruption to the socioeconomic development and changes in formal institutional settings: the less corruption is sensitive to these things, the more persistent it is. In general, one of the stylized facts about corruption is that it is lower in countries with higher levels of socio-economic development and better quality of formal institutions (e.g., Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000) . In our case, we differentiate between market and network corruption and expect that: Uberti, 2018) . Following these studies, we assume that both market corruption and network corruption have historical roots but expect that network corruption is more 'path-dependent' and has deeper roots than market corruption. More concretely, as our sample consists mostly of post-socialist countries, we expect that network corruption should be more related to the historical legacies of the socialist period and/or Ottoman rule than market corruption:
Hypothesis 1.3: network corruption is more related to the historical legacies of the socialist period and/or Ottoman Empire than market corruption.
Corruption and political instability
As noted by Scott "the different patterns of access to influence created by each type of corruption may have quite divergent political consequences" (Scott, 1969 : p.331). Scott, however, did not unpacked this expectation into more concrete and empirically testable hypotheses; we do this below.
Overall, we expect that market corruption should be more associated with political instability than network corruption. Market corruption may undermine the functioning of the state as everyone who pays bribes can turn policies to their favor (Evans, 1989; Kang, 2002) . In this case, the state may become either "the executive committee of the bourgeoisie", or an instrument to extract corruption rents from the population (Johnston, 2005) . In this regard, network corruption should be less destructive, as it assumes that authorities and business form an informal coalition based on partnership, friendship, or family relationships. As a result, authorities are able to control the business, and the business, in its turn, is able to lobby for its interests. In some sense, officials and businessmen may act not as separate actors pursuing economic development. On the other hand, corruption itself is harmful for socio-economic development as it decreases investments and productivity (e.g., Mauro, 1995 On the other hand, the linkage between corruption and political (in)stability may be the reverse and go from political (in)stability to corruption. As political instability shortens public officials' time horizons, they become more interested in extracting the maximum amount of rent in short term (Olson, 1993; Treisman, 2000) , which means widespread market corruption.
Long-term political stability, in contrast, is less compatible with the "predatory" behavior of elites and helps to form mutually beneficial relationships, which implies network corruption.
Therefore, in either case we can expect that:
Hypothesis 2: market corruption is more associated with political instability than network corruption. 'Greasing-the-wheels'
The general consensus in the literature is that corruption has a negative impact on economic development. However, things appear to be less unambiguous when one turns from the level of economy as a whole to the level of particular industries or regions and considers specific time periods. The literature of 1960s-1980s provided many instances when corruption served for the good by helping to avoid strict and excessive state regulation (e.g., Bailey 1966; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985; Nye, 1967; Scott, 1972) . This created a solid basis for the empirical hypothesis that corruption may "grease the wheels" of the economy ( In our paper, we expect strong differences between market and network corruption in their abilities to 'grease'. As market corruption provides more open access to public services than network corruption, we expect the former 'greases' better than the latter. Additionally, LiTS data allow the measurement of respondents' actual engagement in bribery using the following question: Did you or any member of your household make an unofficial payment or gift when using these services over the past 12 months? This question refers to all situations listed in the question on bribery perceptions above. The problem with this question, however, that answers related to each specific situation have a large number of missing values (mostly due to the fact that many people did not use a corresponding public service within the year). Therefore, simple summing all the answers implies the loss of many observations. To keep the maximum number of observations, we assume that a respondent was engaged in bribery if she or any member of her household gave a bribe in at least one situation, and we assume that a respondent was not engaged in bribery if she did not answer positively in any of the eight situations presented above and, at the same time, gave one negative answer at least in one situation.
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The resulting individual bribery experience index is a dummy variable (1 is engaged; 0 is not engaged). The country-level measure of bribery experience is the average of all individual indices. 12 
Other country-level variables
The list of all country-level variables used in this paper, either in the main estimations or in the robustness checks, with a brief description and the sources is presented in Table A1 (in Appendix). Corresponding summary statistics are presented in Table A2 (in Appendix).
To check the validity of our corruption indices we estimate correlations between them and To test Hypothesis 1.2, we use the Human Development Index (HDI) from UNDP as a measure of national socio-economic development and institutional quality. Alternatively, we employ several more specific measures of economic development and institutional quality from 11 For example, if a respondent did not face 7 of 8 situations at all and answered that he did not give a bribe when she\he faced the 8th situation, we assume that such a respondent did not participate in bribery. One problem with this assumption is that we do not know how the respondent would act if he would face some of those 7 situations. However, the data show that about 95% of respondents who did not pay a bribe in one situation did no pay it in all other situations. Thus, a negative answer at least in one situation is a good predictor for negative answers in all other situations. 12 Although the correct measurement of actual experience with bribery is not the central issue in our study, we recognize that respondents tend to underreport behaviors (or attitudes) that are socially condemned and /or illegal (as well as they tend to overreport behaviors that are socially desirable and may represent them in a favorable light). Such a 'socially desirable responding' is a consequence of people's basic psychological need to be approved or liked by others (e.g., Nederhof, 1985; Paulhus, 1984) . It may complicate the measurement of the incidence of some behaviors or revealing true preferences of people via respondents' surveys. In real-life economics or politics, this wish to be liked by others may result in "expressive behaviors" that may create serious negative externalities (see Hillman, 2010) . However, surveys often are the only source of information about the problem under study. In our case, there is no other way to know about people's actual experience with bribery if not asking them directly. At the same time, empirical micro-level literature on determinants of engagement in corruption shows that correlations of engagement in corrupt activities with many socio-demographic characteristics of respondents are qualitatively similar across different surveys. This consistency suggests that, at least in the case of bribery, these questions still help to reveal some "real" and valuable information. the World Bank Development Indicators Project (WB DIP), such as GDP per capita, government effectiveness and regulatory quality indices.
To test Hypothesis 1.3, we measure the legacy of the socialist and Ottoman rule via the length of the period spent by the country under these rules. These estimates are taken from Uberti (2018).
Following Dimitrova-Grazl (2007), Beck & Leaven (2006) , and Uberti (2018), we assume that legacy effects should be stronger for countries that spent more time under these rules.
To test Hypothesis 2, we use the internal conflict index constructed by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group as the main variable to measure national political instability. This index varies from 0 (the least stable system) to 12 (the most stable system) and has been used in many studies on political stability including those that link political instability with corruption (e.g.,
Farzanegan & Witthuhn, 2017).
To test Hypothesis 3, we use a measure of self-employment (as the percentage of total employment) taken from WB DIP. Alternatively, for a robustness check, we employ the percentage of people who were self-employed or independent farmers, which we calculated for each country using LiTS data.
Empirical results
Descriptive analysis
BPI, NCPI, and established measures of corruption
Using the methodology described above, we calculated the bribery perception index (BPI) and network corruption perception index (NCPI) for all 37 countries covered by LiTS in 2010 and 2016. These indices together with their standard error are presented in Table 2 .
To validate our indices, we estimated correlations between them and a few well-established measures of corruption. We found that both NCPI and BPI are significantly correlated with CPI and CCI, but NCPI's correlation is slightly weaker than that of BPI (see first two rows of Table 3 ). Two other external measures of corruption -the percentage of people who offered a bribe and the percentage of those who was asked for a bribe from ESS -are much more strongly correlated with BPI than with NCPI. 13 We obtain similar results when we estimate the correlation of our indices with the percentage of respondents who offered a bribe, calculated using the LiTS sample. NCPI, but not BPI, strongly correlates with the percentage of LiTS respondents who think that having political connections is an important factor for success in the country. Also, NCPI is more strongly correlated than BPI with the WEF favoritism index.
These results show that both BPI and NPCI are strongly correlated with the wellestablished measures of corruption and these correlations are in the right direction. However, the pattern of these correlations differs. While BPI is more strongly correlated with popular composite measures of corruption and measures of actual bribery, NCPI is more strongly correlated with perceptions of the importance of political connections and favoritism. This last fact is especially interesting because NCPI, by construction, reflects petty network corruption, while the WEF favoritism index measures favoritism of public officials in policies and contracts decisions, i.e., it is related to grand network corruption. This suggests that NCPI to some extent captures cross-country differences in grand network corruption as well, which is important for the analysis of the link between network corruption and political (in)stability. 13 The low significance of correlation between BPI and ESS-based measures may be explained by the small number of observations (only 9 in 2015). n/a n/a n/a n/a 35 Sweden 8.2 0.05 9.8 0.13 n/a n/a n/a n/a 36 Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.1 0.1 13.8 0.14 37 Greece n /a n /a n /a n /a 11.2 0.14 13.5 0.12
Corruption rankings
In Note: the median level of NCPI and BPI is taken as the zero point.
In 2016 and in 2010, the countries located in the Balkans had the highest network corruption.
This does not seem to be a coincidence: in their distant past these countries were at the periphery of the Ottoman Empire and thus the level of parochial clientelism in these countries should be especially high as the central state had a weak influence on these territories (Mendelsky, 2007).
Strong network corruption might have survived in these countries due to its embeddedness in social networks and the structures that evolve very slowly and tend to reproduce themselves.
(This linkage will be examined using regression analysis in the next section).
Another remarkable fact is that in 2016 country rankings by BPI and NCPI were more similar Table 3 .) However, most cross-country variation in network corruption still remains unrelated to the variation in bribery. Table 4 shows that the magnitude of changes in BPI was much larger than in NCPI (in absolute terms). For instance, the average percentage point change in BPI was more than -10% compared to less than +1% in NCPI. Therefore, absolute changes in BPI and NCPI, like changes in corruption rankings discussed above, support the expectation that market corruption is more volatile than network corruption. The analysis of the direction of changes in BPI and NCPI gives even more interesting results (see Fig. 3 The dynamics of network corruption, however, were not so encouraging. Our estimations show that NCPI declined in only 10 countries, while in 10 countries it remained almost unchanged and it rose in 12 countries (note that in 10 of these 12 countries BPI declined).
Absolute changes
Clearly, these results do not allow us to say that corruption declined in the region. Rather, it seems that the structure of corruption in post-socialist countries shifted towards the network type. This is especially true for Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan where the large reduction of BPI (by 10%, 28% and 18%, respectively) was associated with a substantial 11 countries 16 countries 2 countries increase in NCPI (by 20%, 10%, and 20%, respectively).
14 These divergent changes suggest that market corruption may transform to network corruption. The available data, unfortunately, do not allow us to examine this issue from a cross-country perspective in more details. 15 
Regression analysis
Contemporary socio-economic development and institutional characteristics
As our descriptive analysis shows, Western European countries exhibit lower levels of market and network corruption than post-socialist countries but their advantage in terms of market corruption is less evident than in terms of bribery. Below we examine the relationships between BPI, NCPI, and contemporary national socio-economic development in more details. Table 5 shows the estimation results of the regressions of BPI (upper panel) and NPCI (lower panel) on the level of socio-economic development measured using HDI. 16 We find a significant and negative association between both types of corruption and HDI both in 2010
and 2016. The correlation of HDI with bribery is, however, much stronger than that with network corruption. For instance, in 2010 R-square in the regression with BPI was 0.4 against only 0.12 for NCPI. We reach the same conclusion when we estimate a pooled regression: Rsquare in regression with BPI is about 0.41 against only 0.16 in regression with NCPI. We also estimated a 'random effects' model which allows us to take into account unobserved 14 Such a high volatility in time of both BPI and NCPI may reflect changes in the composition of countries' samples. However, our auxiliary estimations show that the contribution of compositional changes was negligible: the difference between changes in average BPI and NCPI with and without adjustments for changes in sociodemographic structures of the countries' samples did not exceed 4% of the 2016 index levels. 15 Russia may serve as a good illustration for mutual transformations of market and network corruption. Like many post-socialist countries, and especially CIS countries, Russia entered economic transition with informal networks of blat inherited from the long relatively stable Soviet period. During transition old social networks have been broken and, at the same time, government became less centralized and the value of money has increased. As a result, market corruption has flourished. Levin and Satarov (2000) provide various estimates of monetary costs induced by corruption in the form of impersonal bribery, kickbacks, and extortions. According to these authors, total corruption-related payments amounted to $10-20 billion in a year in 1990s. However, more recent studies point to a reverse shift from market to network corruption that occurred in the 2000s (e.g., Frye et al., 2009; Ledeneva & Shekshnia, 2011; Kravtsova, 2012; Levin & Satarov, 2015; Yakovlev, 2006) . This is in line with LiTS data which show that in the period from 2010 to 2016 BPI in Russia has declined almost by 10% while NCPI has increased by 4%. To some extent, this shift was supported by artificially restricted political competition and low rotation of Russia's political elites. 16 The results are qualitatively the same when we use GDP per capita instead of HDI.
national heterogeneity. This model confirms that bribery is much more related to socioeconomic development than network corruption. 17 As socio-economic development is closely linked to institutional quality, we receive qualitatively the same results when we run regressions with various measures of government effectiveness and regulatory quality and with the degree of the country's democratization (results available upon request). All these findings are in line with Hypothesis 1.2. Note: *** -significant at 1% level; ** -significant at 5% level; * -significant at 10% level. Heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors (Huber-White-Sandwich) in parentheses. CRSE -cluster robust standard errors. Our analysis is not aimed at establishing causal links and we allow both directions of influence: from economic development to corruption and from corruption to economic development.
Communist and Ottoman legacies
the Ottoman legacy is more nuanced. We do not find a significant correlation between bribery and the length of the period spent under the Ottoman rule but find strong positive correlation between the length of this period and network corruption. This suggests that the legacy of Ottoman rule in post-socialist countries consists in the network type of corruption rather than in the market type. Another interesting finding is that the influence of the Ottoman rule on NCPI appears to be stronger than the influence of communism, even in regressions that include both historical legacy variables simultaneously (standardized beta coefficient is 0.537 for the period spent under Ottoman and 0.322 for the period under communism). Overall, these results confirm Hypothesis 1.3 that network corruption is more path-dependent and has deeper historical roots than market corruption. Table 6 Note: *** -significant at 1% level; ** -significant at 5% level; * -significant at 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White-Sandwich) in parentheses.
CRSE -cluster robust standard errors. Communism and Ottoman variables reflect the number of years spent by a country under communism and Ottoman rule, respectively. Table 7 shows the estimation results of the regressions of BPI and NCPI on political instability measured using the ICRG internal conflict index (the higher the index, the greater the political stability). All estimated specifications indicate that bribery is negatively associated with political stability. 18 Although network corruption is negatively associated with political stability as well, this association is weaker (for instance, in the regression using pooled data the standardized beta coefficient for BPI is -0.384 and only -0.253 for NCPI) and less robust.
Political (in)stability
Moreover, NCPI becomes insignificant whenever we include BPI in the regression. These results are in line with Hypothesis 2. Note: *** -significant at 1% level; ** -significant at 5% level; * -significant at 10% level. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Huber-White-Sandwich) in parentheses. CRSE -cluster robust standard errors. 18 Again, we should note that our analysis is not aimed at establishing causal links and we allow both directions of influence: from political (in)stability to corruption and from corruption to political (in)stability. Table 8 shows the estimation results of the regressions of the rate of self-employment on BPI and NCPI. All estimated specifications show that self-employment is positively correlated with bribery but not correlated with network corruption. This supports Hypothesis 3 and confirms the theoretical expectations that bribery is able to 'grease the wheels' better than network corruption. Note: *** -significant at 1% level; ** -significant at 5% level; * -significant at 10% level. Heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors (Huber-White-Sandwich) in parentheses CRSE -cluster robust standard errors.
Greasing the wheels
Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our findings we made several checks (all results are available upon request). First, we tried alternative measures of socio-economic development, political stability, and self-employment in our regressions. Table A3 in Appendix).
Secondly, when testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 we included in our regressions GDP per capita (in logs) as the integrative control variable of national socio-economic development and institutional quality. Our main findings remained qualitatively the same, which indicates that the stronger association of BPI with political instability and self-employment is not a byproduct of some omitted variable. Our results did not change when we controlled for EU/non-EU membership.
Thirdly, we checked the extent to which our findings are robust to outliers. We identified all observations with dfbeta greater than 2/sqrt(N) (see Besley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980) and reestimated all regressions on a sample excluding these observations. This procedure did not affect our conclusions.
Fourthly, we re-estimated all regressions where either BPI or NCPI serve as dependent variables (presented in Tables 5 and 6 ) using WLS (countries where indices are estimated with less precision received less weight). All results remained unaffected.
Finally, as mentioned above, we adjusted our aggregated bribery and network corruption indices measured in 2016 for changes in the composition of national LiTS samples from 2010 to 2016, and this adjustment did not affect our results.
Summary and Discussion
The dominant economic approach towards corruption tends to reduce all corruption to bribery in the form of market-like impersonal transactions between bureaucrats and private actors. This approach ignores the fact that corruption usually relies on social connections. In this study we present both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that ignoring this substantially limits and even biases the understanding of corruption.
We distinguish between market corruption -impersonal bribery -and network corruption conditional on social connections, and analyze them jointly using data from the 2010 and 2016 rounds of LiTS which cover all post-socialist countries. We show that bribery and network corruption are weakly correlated at the country level and have different qualities. The former is more persistent, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and more associated with communist and pre-communist legacies than bribery.
Network corruption, unlike bribery, is not associated with political instability and the incidence of self-employment in the country.
These results suggest that distinguishing between market and network corruption is useful Our finding that bribery is strongly and positively correlated with the incidence of selfemployment is line with hypothesis that corruption may 'grease-the-wheels' (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Vial & Hanoteau, 2010) . However, we do not find such an association in the case of network corruption, which suggests that it is the market type of corruption that is able to 'grease'. Therefore, if one acknowledges that market corruption is more vulnerable than network corruption and tends either to vanish or to evolve into network corruption, then one should give less weight to the 'grease-the-wheels' hypothesis in practice.
Another finding that clearly illustrates how focusing exclusively on bribery may be shortsighted is the decrease of bribery in the face of growing network corruption in post-socialist countries. Populist anti-corruption campaigns could celebrate victory, but in reality corruption just changed its face and became more 'networked', i.e., conditional on social connections and secret. This structural shift demands much more emphasis on such anti-corruption policies as removing conflicts of interest and the rotation of public officials (Abbink, 2004) . 
